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Introduction
In international relations, like in the world of social relations, identity 
itself can be defined as a unity and self-evidence of an actor that is derived 
from the cognitive acts of synthesis and integration by which the actor 
tries to ascertain the continuity and coherence of their life praxis. Such 
a continuity and coherence can be constructed in the light of experiencing 
a difference. The concept of identity in sociological theories of the subject 
includes the idea of a limited autonomy. The identity is limited, provi-
sional and fragile, and it is all of these things unavoidably. It is recognized 
in the  process of interactions with others. According to Jurgen Straub 
(2001), the process of forming the identity is inevitably connected with 
a specific experience of a crisis. On a certain level of development, states 
experience destabilization and their political orientations are called into 
question, which will only later give directions for the future actions (Mar-
cia, 2007). Moreover, the inherent parts of identity are: personal charac-
teristics, understood as the ability to bind anxiety, to perform effectively 
in the face of turmoil, independence of external pressure, autonomy and 
self-directedness, change in self-esteem and conformity. Peter Burke, for 
instance, claims that language is one of the most important markers of 
identity. Speaking or using the same language and the same notions is 
a  simple and effective way of indicating solidarity. By  the same token, 
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speaking a different language is an equally effective way of distinguishing 
oneself from other individuals or groups (Blot, 2003).
Along with its growing economic status, China has drawn the inter-
national attention to itself. The question “who China is?” has become 
more than evident, China having been engaged in the World affairs as 
the UN or WTO member. The basic problem to be answered in the paper 
is how China judges the West and what kind of argument it uses to build 
its identity at the first stage and, at the second, to build its own model of 
development, The second issue to be discovered is what kind of role de-
veloping countries play in shaping their moral identity and to what extent 
it might be useful in order to avoid the image of the next capitalist power? 
Qin Yaqing advocates the idea that China’s identity depends heavily on 
different type of activities it has undertaken and on the level of its interac-
tion with the outside world. He proves this thesis by claiming that during 
Mao’s times, China’s activities were revolutionary-oriented, which is why 
China possessed the “revolutionary identity”. Contrary to this, with Deng 
Xiaoping’s “hide China’s intentions”, the Middle Kingdom was a self-ori-
ented actor. Taking the  responsibility and being the  member of major 
international bodies, such as United Nations, World Trade Organization, 
World Bank etc., China has changed its identity into “guannianxing rent-
ong” – a concept-oriented identity. This means that China has expressed 
its hope to contribute to the  World’s issues in the  nonmaterial sphere 
(Qin Yaqing, 2009).
In a  separate section, the  Author discusses the  issue of China’s 
self-perception as a developing country, the internal debates on the global 
economic crisis, China’s model of development and, finally, the  major 
challenges and obstacles for the model. The major issues to be answered 
in the analysis are: how China intends to behave; why it is afraid of chang-
ing its status from the developing to a developed country and how the cri-
sis affects and shapes China’s international behavior. On the one hand, 
the Chinese policy makers assumed the so-called Marxian approach to 
the problem of the crisis by saying that the capitalist World has provoked 
it, but, on the other, they have to rescue Western markets from the crisis 
in order to protect their own interest. Inevitably, the crisis puts China on 
the same level of “responsibility” with capitalist states. Although China 
is not the trouble maker, in order to rescue its own development it has to 
help “the Western capitalist” World.
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China as a Developing Country
Since the  establishment of the  People’s Republic of China, China 
perceives the international relationships in terms of the duality between 
the  developed and the  developing countries, the  North and the  South, 
the poor and rich. In this context, China obviously puts itself on the weak-
er side. Sharing it’s sympathies with “the Third World”, apart from win-
ning the  financial benefits from international organizations, plays an 
important role in constructing China’s identity. The differentiation be-
tween “us” – the poor, undeveloped and oppressed nations and “them” 
– the  rich, developed and capitalist ones, has played an important role 
in shaping China’s ideological and moral position in the World affairs. 
The ideological being standpoint was position gone with the reform era, 
but the second one, relating to moral status, remains unchanged.
Since early 1950s, Chinese diplomacy declared its role in and contri-
bution to the World’s affairs. In the article commemorating Sun Yat-sen, 
Mao Zedong emphasized that due to its position in the  global affairs, 
China had an obligation to make “some” contributions to the mankind. 
In 1956, Zhou Enlai stated that although China was a  relatively poor 
country, it would try to help other countries to develop their own econo-
mies (Guo Xinning, Xu Qiyu 2007). The Chinese assistance was based on 
“eight principles” declared in January 1964. It was supposed to be based 
on the following rules: the principle of equality and mutual benefit, with-
out any special privilege for the Chinese side, providing some assistance in 
order to help the recipient countries to become gradually self-reliant and 
to find their own path of development, low interests rate, possibility to 
return the equipment and supplies that do not meet the agreed specifica-
tions and quality (Zhou Hong, 2009). After the Cultural Revolution Deng 
Xiaoping needed to change the whole path of China’s reforms. However, 
even under the new circumstances Deng Xiaoping admitted in May 1978 
that “China is still very poor. That is why our contribution to the interna-
tional proletarian movement is still very low. Our contribution to the hu-
manity, mainly to the Third World, is dependent on our modernization 
and economic development. As a socialist country, China will always be 
in the Third World and never seek hegemony” (Deng Xiaoping, 1978). 
The contribution of the Chinese to the World’s peace and stability will be 
based on giving an equal opportunity for development to all the countries 
in the World. During the 1990s and at the beginning of the new Century, 
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China has been emphasizing its status of a  developing country and 
the  importance of the developing countries as such. Interestingly, since 
the early 1980s, China sticks to the “peace and development” rhetoric and 
in the Party reports both, Jiang Zemin (1997, 2002) and Hu Jintao (2007), 
repeated Deng Xiaoping’s formula of international relationship.
China’s perception as of a developing country emerged from the colonial rules and, 
similarly to other Asian and African countries, from the  fact that it has suffered 
the imperialist bullying. During the Cold War era this relationship strengthened Chi-
na’s position against the “American led anti-China chorus” and, in 1960s, against 
the Soviet Union. After the Cold War, during the early 1990s., the common identity 
of China and other developing countries streaked with the  same experience with 
the West, which allowed China to come out the shadow of isolation after the Tian-
anmen crackdown.
Due to China’s unchangeable identity as a developing country during 
its period of reform, the  cooperation has been intensified. The harmo-
nious World concept should be understood as the developing countries’ 
voice. In his speech on hexie, in October 2005, apart from providing ex-
planation of the  concept of harmony by means of a  variety of cultural 
dimensions, coming from sources such as Confucius’ great unity, through 
Universal Harmony, Hu Jintao used a kind of combination of Marxism, 
Maoism and Deng Xiaoping Thoughts. The Chinese leadership promotes 
six qualities: the rule of law, fairness and justice, honesty and fraternal-
ism and harmony with nature (Mahoney, 2008). Using Confucius’ moral 
tone, China portrays itself as a moral power. The major part of Hu Jintao’s 
speech in the United Nations was devoted to the inequality and domina-
tion of the Western type of development. The morality is visible in pro-
moting of the right for development. The current model of development 
has placed emphasis on economic growth, regardless of the social cost. 
In the  new harmonious model the  priority and the  advantages gained 
from the global growth were given to people. The most significant priority 
should be given to people’s prosperity. A lot of importance was also at-
tached to cooperation, equality, justice and opportunity for development. 
Moreover, the development should not be based on the state concept, but 
on human rights for prosperity. Although the  problem of development 
might seem to be primarily of the economic nature, in fact is the major 
issue connected with human rights. In the context of building the com-
mon prosperity, the  developing countries, together with China, should 
strengthen the South-South cooperation and promote the new concept of 
the human rights (Liu Jie, 2009).
Dominik Mierzejewski62
China would enhance coordination, promote interests of the developing countries, 
increase development assistance, strengthen the development of human resources, 
enhance technological development capabilities, and build its market’s potential. 
South-South should build a close cooperation to promote new international economy 
order, financial reform, improve trade environment and create favorable conditions to 
narrow the development gap. What is more, in political statement concerning hexie 
shijie, Hu Jintao failed to use the government as a legitimate representative of the na-
tions. Instead, the statements contained the description of a state-state relationship, 
and the relationship between the developing and developed countries. It was the rela-
tionship between people, however, that has become the major component of the new 
harmonious order (Hu Jintao, 2005).
The  observation of Hu Jintao’s speeches leads to an interesting 
conclusion that China preserves its people-to-people relationship as 
the consequence of finding its own legitimacy in the people, not govern-
ment-oriented ideology. Renmin becomes the inherent part of the internal 
debate on being the socialist power. In this context, the Marxian ideolo-
gy should be perceived, similarly to tianxia (all under the heaven), as an 
anti-government set of values. (Zhao Tingyang, 2009). The major reason 
for using reference to “the people” indicates that China puts itself into 
the poorest shoes and tries to defend its interest.
In July 2005, at the Meeting of Leaders from China, India, Brazil, 
South Africa and Mexico in Gleneagles, Hu Jintao presented his view on 
globalization. In his speech, one can easily notice similarities to Mao Ze-
dong’s Thought on the rich North and poor South. The problem of global 
injustice was broadly discussed, and the Chinese leader presented China’s 
view on the issue:
In order to seize the opportunities and rise to the challenges, developing countries 
should, on the one hand, rely on themselves to grow the economy through reform, 
innovation and persistent efforts to emancipate and develop the productive forces, 
and on the other, create a favorable environment for development by opening up to 
the outside world and actively participating in economic and technological competi-
tion and cooperation with other countries (Hu Jintao, 2005).
Although G20 was proposed by  G7 the  Finance Ministers in Ger-
many in 1999, China has made a  good use of this mechanism. Being 
the second global economy and the developing country simultaneously, 
China pushes the reforms further in order of reduce the US currency dom-
ination. The global crisis has created new opportunities for re-establish-
ing the global economic governance framework, but it failed to introduce 
changes into the post-Cold War nation-state system. Moreover, the system 
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has been still based on the economic globalization and, in fact, on the cap-
italist and neo-liberal economic system. Within the framework, the devel-
oping countries’ status on the global scale can only be passive. The role 
of G20 was based on accepting the Western values and it was only a tech-
nical amendment to the Western type of economic system. The United 
States, Europe and Japan have still occupied the most important position 
in international economic structure. On the other hand, because of its 
huge population, internal disparities, corruption and pollution, China’s 
international economic status has been backward. Even the  fact that it 
has been the second largest economy, has failed to change China’s status. 
(Wang Guoxing, 2010).
The above mentioned arguments put China in the position of the leader of the un-
derdeveloped countries in G20. In fact, the E11 – developing countries in G20 have 
been weaker than the  rest of developed countries. On the one hand, the develop-
ing countries’ share in the global economy was counted as only 22,1%, while that 
of the developed countries as 55,2%. Contrary to its place in the global economy, 
the average economic growth rate of E11 in 2009 accounted for 2,6%, while the glob-
al economic growth was -0.6%, and the developed countries’ economic growth rate 
-3.4%, respectively. However, apart from the economic growth, the developing coun-
tries have faced the problem of inflation. In December 2009, the CPI growth in India 
accounted for 14,97%, and in January 2010 the Central Bank increased the deposit 
rates of commercial banks by 75 basis points and was the first of the BRIC countries 
to tighten its currency policies. In Russia, by slow income growth, consumer demand 
and the ruble currency stability, the inflation rate in 2009 raised to 8,8%, the highest 
since the 1991 Soviet collapse. The inflation rate in China was last reported at 4,9 % 
in January, 2011. From 1994 until 2010, the average inflation rate in China was 4,25 
%, reaching the historical height of 27,70 % in October of 1994, and the lowest record 
of -2,20 % in March of 1999. In China, the inflation problem forced the People’s Bank 
of China to increase the  reserve rates for banks seven times between 2018–2011 
(Zhang Yuyan, Tian Feng, 2010).
Portrayed as the  strongest among the  weakest, China has taken 
the  lead and built a  strong position in negotiations with the developed 
countries. Although China has adhered to the open market, it has still 
been fighting against all forms of protectionism, raising the issue of equal-
ity and representation of developing countries in the  decision-making 
process in the  global financial institutions. The  needs for the  interna-
tional financial regulatory mechanism, expanding the scope of regulation, 
specifying responsibilities and strengthening regulatory cooperation has 
become the major theme of discussions. On the one hand, the develop-
ing countries should be considered as the  largest group of victims, but 
also as the most important force for the recovery of the World’s econo-
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my. The global community should specify the major goals of the global 
economic governance and promote economic globalization towards well 
balanced, win-win directions. In this context, China’s diplomacy has re-
peated the old slogans of whether big or small, strong or weak, rich or poor, 
each country should be considered as an equal part of the global econo-
my, and should participate in the governance process as equal, and enjoy 
the  corresponding representation in the  decision making process. This 
not only built China’s credibility and legitimized its position in the global, 
responsible governance, but also urged the country to strengthen its effec-
tiveness. Only by mutual understanding, respecting mutual differences 
and considering different national circumstances, could the developed and 
developing countries promote and ensure cooperation. Global econom-
ic governance requires appropriate institutions and special arrangements 
that would promote equality (Renmin Ribao, 2009).
The Crisis and the China Model
After the crisis broke out, debates on the causes of the crisis, its out-
come and consequences for China and the whole World have been broad-
ly discussed. Although economic globalization has given the benefits of 
spreading new technologies, it has been led by the developed countries. 
While the major goal of the West was to unify the World in terms of polit-
ical, economic and social systems, it has led to disparities and contradic-
tions among nations. (Jiang Ying, 2009). The system should be improved 
and the  role of the  West redefined. In March 2009, China suggested 
improving the  international financial system by  introducing reforms of 
the international financial regulatory system in order to accelerate the di-
versification of the international monetary system. The Chinese sugges-
tion to reduce the dependence on the dollar and U.S. dollar fluctuations 
was supported by Russia, India, Brazil or Indonesia (Wang Guoxing, Chen 
Qing 2010).
The  global economic crisis has strengthened the  theoretical discussion, but, at 
the  same time, the  shortage of practical findings on how to resolve the  problems 
effectively has been neglected. Although the Chinese authorities focused mainly on 
the internal impact of the crisis on the Chinese economy and society, like in analyses 
by Sun Liping and Mao Yishi, 30% of articles published on the websites for intellec-
tuals has been related to the theoretical problems, analyzed by Cui Zhiyuan or Wang 
Yongli, among others. Minority of scholars have touched the problem of the Global 
Order and impact of the crisis on China’s foreign relations, as published by Zheng 
Yongnian. (compare graph no 1).
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Graph 1. Chinese scholars’ perception of global financial crisis (spring 2011)
Source: own query on the website for intellectuals www.aisixiang.cn (key word: crisis 
– weiji).
The most interesting debates were stimulated by theoretical approach 
to capitalism and socialism as the subject of litigation. Usually, capital-
ism, as quoted from Engels, fuels itself in the crisis cycles which, gradually 
uncoiling, finally weaken the system and collapse. Some Chinese scholars 
used the Marxian view saying that even after the recovery of the capitalism 
system, the contradictions would bring about the more violent crisis and 
build the platform for transition to socialism and, inevitably, to commu-
nist society (Liu Haixia, 2009). However, contrary to the abovementioned 
statement, as observed by  Gao Feng (2010), the  socialist systems, like 
the Paris Commune, the Soviet Union or Eastern European countries col-
lapsed. Within the short history of 200 years, capitalism has suffered from 
more than 20 global crises and, paradoxically, has survived and strength-
ened its position in the World. This has exposed the  socialist ideology 
to ridicule. The key answer is backed by the reason of the technological 
revolution that has contributed to the development of the capitalist world. 
In this new phase, war and revolution in the traditional understanding of 
these words, cannot be carried out. Every new stage in capitalism, how-
ever, is closely related to the fate of socialism. How to improve socialism 
has remained a burning issue. How to define the current stage of history? 
The contemporary capitalism has changed its nature and has failed to fit 
the past definitions of Marx or Lenin. Although it is still the monopoly 
capitalism, in its form and shape it differs from the way in which it was 
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described in the past (Gao Feng, 2009). Financial globalization has pro-
moted the endless expansion of financial derivatives, and at the end of 
2007, the global stock of derivatives amounts to 630 trillion U.S. dollars. 
“The globalization of financial accumulation as the dominant system” has 
become an inherent part of critical discourse and Marxian deliberation on 
capital itself. The United States have become the most noticeable exam-
ple: while the manufacturing sector constituted 27% of GDP in 1950, in 
2007 it fell down to 11,7%, and, over the same period, virtual economy 
created the proportion of GDP from 11,37% to 20,67%. In the last two 
years, the  vitality of capitalism has been questioned and has seriously 
shaken the world’s confidence in the Western system. The global public 
opinion has voiced reservations about the capitalist free market economy. 
The most skeptical of the future of the Western model were the French: 
for 43% of the population the model went bankrupt. Moreover, some of 
the Asian journals have raised the question of superiority of China, as in 
Singaporean Lianhe Zaobao, and even Joseph Nye has propagated the end 
of American capitalism (Liu Zhiming, 2010).
As Wang Jian (2004) from the China Macroeconomic Institute argued, 
the nature of capitalism has altered its face. In the ‘virtual capitalism era’, 
as capital flows mainly through stock markets and bonds, China has be-
come the center of global production and could lay down the conditions 
for the other powers. The situation of ‘real production’ helped China to 
afford its rising status.
Furthermore, the  reforms or adjustments of the  capitalistic system 
have been another important issue. To some extent, the capitalist coun-
tries have changed their nature and institutional system in the way that 
the  capitalism fails to be a  real capitalism. The  world economic crisis 
demonstrated the  limitations of the role of a  free market economy and 
urged governments to take measures to revive the  economy. However, 
as before, capitalism constantly faces new problems and generates new 
social conflicts. During crises, like in the  late 1920s, the  society asked 
the authorities to take more responsibility for social and economic sta-
bility. That is why the  Western governments have sometimes taken 
the adjustment measures, such as making intervention in the economy, 
creating new workplaces and alleviating social contradictions. Although 
the governments have taken measures against the crisis, they should not 
be considered as the socialist measures because only the socialist authori-
ties could take the socialist responsibility. The crisis has created favorable 
conditions for the socialist movement (Li Yining, 2009).
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In 2004, the Financial Times pointed the needs for having one’s own 
model of development. In case of China it was named “Beijing Consen-
sus”, understood as a development model to achieve equitable, high-quality 
growth. The consensus demanded an extremely cautious implementation 
of policies such as privatization and free trade. The best idea of develop-
ment was to experiment on a  small scale, establishing the  special eco-
nomic zones, and actively saving the  country’s territorial integrity and 
interests, as well as the accumulation of foreign exchange. The strategy 
definitely rejected shock therapy and a transformation pattern in favor of 
a “trial and check” strategy, as the Chinese saying goes “while crossing 
the river, touch the stones”. Along with its step by step economic reform, 
the  Chinese government reformed the  political system, and the  “three 
represents” should be taken as best example. The  “brilliant” effect of 
the Chinese reforms was possible to achieve due to the collective Con-
fucianism culture and effectiveness of management by  the Communist 
Party of China (Wang Zhijun, 2010). Through the pilot led reforms, Chi-
na has summed up the experience and lessons, and, next, it will carry 
out the  reforms. This should ensure the  social stability and lead from 
the economic to political, social and cultural reforms. In fact, however, if 
the country has its own model, the model should be, if not exported, at 
least copied by others. The technical problems have risen: How to find 
other countries which, due to strict birth control policies, will safe around 
27 trillion yuan of social compensation fee? (Shi Wei, 2006).
As adhered by  the  supporters of the  China’s model, the  Chinese 
go their own way, because imitating the  experiences of other countries 
has failed to suit the national conditions. Moreover, the party integrates 
the Marxist role into practice and reinforces the communist leadership. 
The model is based on economy development as a central issue which de-
termines the proper development of political, social and cultural structures 
(Xin Xiangyang, 2010). Chinese scholars have claimed that the  China 
uses the model in a way contrary to Francis Fukuyama’s “end of history”, 
“end of ideology” and final victory of liberalism ideas. The model arising 
in China has challenged the  Western ideology and has shown that, as 
a great and independent nation, the Chinese have their own way of devel-
opment (Liu Tongfeng (2010). The calls to defend China’s own identity 
against the threat of Westernization can be interpreted as a reawakening 
of the dispute over universalism and relativism. The building of its own 
identity contrary to the  “other” articulates the  needs of understanding 
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“self” and building a relationship with the “other” (Sun Weiping, 2008). 
For some scholars the Sinization of Marxism should be the remedy for 
the  Western threat. The  World in its ideological sphere is regarded as 
“western” and “non-western”. The uniqueness of China’s model is based 
on Socialism with Chinese Characteristics. Apart from the rapid econom-
ic development, the Communist Party has rectified “egoism”, creatively 
adjusting Marxism to the economic growth, it has combined the market 
economy with planned economy and built the  fruitful development of 
the Marxian model, which could be learnt by other developing countries 
(Wang Xue, Zhang Zhi, 2009). The major line of conflict is drawn be-
tween the capitalist logic of the West and non-capitalist logic of the oth-
ers. Using the global economy, the West aspires to building the ideological 
unification of the World through building the global united identity. As 
a result, the conflict and the self-defense mood in the non-Western states 
has been build up (Wang Xinyan, 2010). The model has been constructed 
under the shadow of humiliations and only pragmatic approach of seeking 
for the truth has enabled China to find a way out form backwardness (Wu 
Yumin, 2010).
The model has been directed towards the developing countries. Con-
trary to the Western type of logic, it has strengthened the  right for in-
dividual countries’ development, and by  these means it has provided 
the  countries with a  better position in negotiations with the West. Af-
ter the Cold War, during the early 1990s, the common identity derived 
from sharing the same experience with the West, allowed China to come 
out the shadow of isolation. Having its own model has underlined Chi-
na’s own identity, and “the third wave of democracy” attracted the Third 
World and even some leftist in the West. Furthermore, due to China’s 
unchangeable identity of a developing country, during its reform period 
the  cooperation has been intensified. As Yan Yanming (2010) claims, 
the South-South dialogue resulted in strengthening the voice of the de-
veloping countries for equality and justice. The support of the develop-
ing countries ensures the World’s peace and stability. Together with its 
partners, China has the same political goal that differs from the goals of 
the capitalist countries. Although they are under pressure of the “big pow-
er”, they hope to build the multilateral World with “unity in diversity” as 
a major ideological wisdom (Liu Qingjian, 2006). In fact, during the era 
of reform, as mentioned by Wu Yumin (2010), the  „evil of capitalism” 
has affected the status of workers and peasants. The situation has drawn 
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the attention of the authorities to the problem of social justice, to which 
they reacted with promoting “harmony among people”. The intervention 
of the government and the  regulation of the  free market should finally 
bring equality and justice.
Challenges of International Market
The theoretical discussion should be interpreted as a rhetorical clash 
over who is better in applying the socialist principles and who will really 
win the competition. The reality has been more complex, though. China 
should keep the eye on the Western type of development as a major reason 
for crisis. The crisis has affected China’s export-oriented economy and, fi-
nally, unsettled China’s economic growth. This has stimulated the needs 
for further reforms: internal consumption and the development of tertiary 
(Wu Jinglian, 2009). Apart from the ideological oriented discourse, howev-
er, the most important factor has been how to find a proper way to balance 
the social justice and the capitalist logic of bringing the profits.
Contrary to the abovementioned arguments, which are rather rhetor-
ical in nature, some people argue that China should learn from the West 
and treat the crisis as a lesson. The global economy dropped down to 3,3% 
(4.9% calculated by PPP), and was lower than in 2007 – 3,6% (calculated as 
5,2% at PPP). The developing countries’ growth rate was 7,1% and it was 
higher than the growth in the developed countries. According to Zheng 
Bingxi (2010), the rest of the World should provide a remedy for the cur-
rent situation. The developing countries should expand the South-South 
cooperation in trade and investment and stimulate internal consumption 
in order to reduce dependence on the U.S. market (Zheng Bingxi, 2008).
Moreover, in China, the  government revenues grow faster than 
the GDP – 16% to 10,4% from 1995 to 2007 respectively and, what is 
more important, faster than citizens’ incomes: 8% yearly in urban areas, 
6,2% in rural areas. The capital collected by the authorities was used for 
the development and investment. From 1992 to 2007, the  salaries of 
the average people dropped down from 68,8% of GDP to 52,3%, while 
the salaries of governmental officials and entrepreneurs grew by 16 %. 
Even in the crisis, the Western countries could handle its development. 
According to Chen Zhiwu (2009), the capital market in the West has 
become a catalyst for innovation. The stock market has inspired peo-
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ple’s enthusiasm, it built the possibility of “being young with the great 
capital” and the  basis for innovation. Contrary to this, for 30 years, 
China’s development was based on the export led market economy and 
national investment. Although the crisis in the West has provoked some 
skeptical voices about the  Western model, China has no choice, but 
to promote the development of financial markets, deregulation, rather 
than enhance control and let its own companies like Lenovo, Sinopec to 
follow the principles of free market economy. Otherwise, the competi-
tiveness of China’s financial industry would get weaker (Chen Zhiwu, 
2009). The people have become the biggest victim of the crisis and, in 
this context, the  role of government should be limited to strengthen 
people’s confidence in the market economy and to prevent spreading of 
negative beliefs (Gong Qiang, 2009).
More to the point, in the financial crisis, China, as the world’s big-
gest trading nation, has become the biggest victim of protectionism. Chi-
na has entered the period of trade friction and the inevitable relationship 
with its major trade partners (Zhang Lei, 2010). To some extent, this 
neglects the shortage of Chinese export oriented and comparative advan-
tages oriented economy. From 1978, the economic growth has depended 
on export – in 1985 9.1%, in 1990 14,2%, in 2000 – 23,4%, in 2008 
37,8%. During the  global crisis, in 2008, in more than ¾ of Guang-
dong’s toys producers closed down their business, and the ongoing ex-
port drooped down of 53%. In the first half of 2009, the China’s global 
export fell down by 23,5% (Wei Song, 2010). The abovementioned fac-
tors have shaken the Chinese pro-export economy. Combating the cri-
sis, China should effectively improve the development of technology and 
technological achievements, build solid basis for new loans, improve 
the capital market, investment and financial system and mechanisms 
to enhance private investment. Secondly, according to Michael Porter ’s 
theory, China should follow the path of a developed country and build 
an effective industrial cluster. This would enhance transfer of tech-
nology and integration of product and improvement of profit. Without 
the industrial integration China will fail to build its position on the in-
ternational market. According to the modern economy theory, China is 
still in a typical dual type of economy. The characteristics of structural 
surplus rural labor force is very obvious. In face of the financial crisis, 
China’s traditional labor-intensive and export-oriented enterprises have 
reduced the  employment. The pressure on society has built the  basis 
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for the transformation of traditional agricultural society to industriali-
zation of agriculture. Promoting “the business citizens”, like in 1980s, 
the US or Japan should be taken seriously. Financial institutions should 
focus on improving financial services, providing a rich variety of finan-
cial products and increasing the “business people” financial support; as 
well as on exploring “small loans + business + credit community devel-
opment training” model actively (Jiang Dingyi, 2009). China’s financial 
market, in comparison with the United States, is still in early stages of 
development. Therefore, it should also accelerate the financial reform 
and financial innovation to improve the  financial system. In the  last 
30 years, the United States have become the leader of the financial mar-
kets. By contrast, China’s financial innovation is insufficient and finan-
cial products are simple, and need to be improved, otherwise it cannot 
meet the economic demands. In fact, China has been playing auxiliary 
role for the Western development (Hu Huangban, 2009).
Conclusion
Along with its growing economy, the international status of the Mid-
dle Kingdom has been changing. The  change from a  developing to de-
veloped country announced by the Western media triggers the  internal, 
theoretical debates inside the academic cycles. Basically, China faces dual 
track problems: rhetorical-propaganda issues and the  reality of global 
trade and markets.
In reality, capitalism has been more attractive for the Chinese, and 
has made socialism fall behind. For the  officials, the  Chinese model 
should be a combination of capitalism and socialism, but they have been 
afraid of “losing their face” by de facto promoting capitalism. China has 
felt anxious about being a leader, but the rule of socialism, as pointed 
by some Chinese scholars, will defend itself. Sticking firmly to its be-
liefs, China should promote socialism, justice and equality. According 
to Marxist’s view, equality will never be fully achieved unless people are 
economically equal. That is the reason why the abused classes need their 
representation and access to the means of subsistence (Worsley, 2002). 
In this context, political criticism does not require from people to learn 
new ideas or facts, but to look at their ‘actual situation and relations’, 
and distinguish right from wrong (Pleasants, 2002). Moreover, it seems 
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to be written into the dialectical materialism that every economic order 
grows to a state of maximum efficiency, but in the meantime produces 
contradictions and, as a result, leads to self-annihilation. The new order 
should be based on morality, equality, justice and, what is more im-
portant, should challenge the Westphalian state-centric system, which 
was the major source of exploitation. The Marxian set of values has an 
influence on China’s judgment of globalization and relationship with 
the developing countries.
Sharing the same identity with other “aggravated parties”, China could 
easily build the coalition of good will e.g. in United Nations. The position 
of being the defender of oppressed nations was used by China to the full-
est. As before, the developing status ensured the establishment of coali-
tion in the United Nations and, during the crisis, building of the “anti-US 
dollar coalition of good will”. Identifying itself with the developing coun-
tries, China put itself on the same level as “the poorer ones” and tries to 
find the way to protect their interests. This comparison finds expression 
in China’s declaration of unity with the Third World and, de facto, its un-
changeable policy towards the developing countries (Wang Xinyan, 2010).
On the other hand, the major paradox of China as a strong, rising 
economic power is that in order to secure its own economic growth, Chi-
na has to promote multilateralism and liberal values of free trade market. 
As a consequence of the crisis, the level of American import has dropped 
down and has affected the Chinese market. To act in the interest of Chi-
na, Beijing has to take the step towards rescuing American and Western 
markets (Zhou Jiren, 2009).
In order to keep its growth alive, China vows for liberal trade, contrary 
to its official statements of equality and justice. Moreover, the  internal 
disparities and technological backwardness has forced China to promote 
rhetorical justice and equality. However, the specific approach to its own 
identity as the developing country has become the inherent part of China’s 
Marxian oriented discourse. According to Yu Keping, the former director 
of the Central Compilation and Translation Bureau, as long as capitalism 
will exist, socialism will be the inherent part of global processes. Adhering 
to the dialectical persecution, even within the changing nature of interna-
tional relations from the ‘nation-state period’ to the ‘the post-state peri-
od’, China promotes its developing country status.
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